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Copyright, Fair Use
and the For-Profit Sector

by James S. Heller

James S. Heller is the director of the law library and a professor of law at
the Callege of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virgin ia.
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INTERPRETING COPYRIGHT LAW IN LIBRARIES IS NOT AN EASY TASK.
Applying the fair use provision (section 107) and the library exemption (section 108) of the Copyright Act to the forprofit sector is particularly difficult. In determining whether a particular activity is permitted as a fair use under the
section 108 exemption, one must dis't inguish between the different types of for-profit institutions. On one hand are
J

copyshops, such as Kinkos, which generate income from making copies. Similar to copyshops are for-profit companies
- such as TOI Library Services and Instant Information Systems - whose business is to provide docum~nt delivery
services for a fee. Then there are companies, such as the Texaco corporation or law firms, whose business is not to
make copies, but who instead reproduce copyrighted works only inddentally.

Because they are not libraries, copyshops and fee-based
document delivery companies do not qualify for the
section 108 library exemption. And because they are
in the business of making and distributing copies, it is
doubtful that copying they do for their customers could
qualify as a fair use. Copyshops and document delivery suppliers, however, are different from companies
that do not directly profit from making copies for their
customers. A review of selected litigation involving publishers and the for-profit sector sheds light on the application of the fair use doctrine and library exemption in the for-profit sector.

Litigation Involving Copyshops
Publishers took on copyshops in the 1980's, beginning
with a successful lawsuit by Basic Books against the Gnomon Corporation, which operated several stores in the
Northeast. Gnomon was enjoined by a Connecticut federal district court from making copies of journal articles
and book chapters, putting them together as compilations
and selling them.
1\vo subsequent cases received greater publicity than the
Gnomon case, probably because the end-users were university students. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp. 1, the copyshop was sued by several publishers for
making photocopies of copyrighted articles and portions
of books and compiling them in what are commonly·called
"coursepacks." Kinkos maintained that the copying was
educational because it was done for students at the request of their instructors. The federal district court disagreed and described the copying as non-educational and
commercial. The court concluded that E:inkos was a willful infringer, criticizing its internal p~licies and procedures and its failure to educate and adequately supervise
their employees.
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The second case, decided in the 1990s, involved Michigan
Document Service, a copyshop in Ann Arbor. In the "MDS"
easel, a decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in favor of the copyshop
was later reversed by the entire court. Unlike the Kinkos
case, the Original appeals court panel called MDS's copying "educational" and held that its producing coursepacks
for students at the University of Michigan was a fair use.
The entire court reversed and held that MDS's systematic
and premeditated copying for commercial motivation was
infringing. (The court also noted that MDS's copying went
beyond what was agreed to in the classroom guidelines
envisioned by Congress that were included in the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act)l.

litigation Involving For-Profit Document
Deliverers
In the early 1990s West Publishing Co., a publisher of law

books, sued several for-profit information brokers for infringement. One defendant (Aaron-Smith) settled with West
and agreed not to copy and distribute the proprietary features from West caselaw reporters, such as headnotes and
synopses of the published court decisions. The other defendant, Faxlaw, was enjoined from copying and distributing the proprietary features of West publications.

Litigation Involving Businesses and
Corporations for In-House Copying
In the early 1980s, Harper & Row Publishers sued pharmaceutical corporations American Cyanamid and E.R.
Squibb for in-house duplication of copyrighted journal
articles. Both cases resulted in out-of-court settlements,
with each company agreeing to join and pay royalties to
the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a clearinghouse
for the receipt of royalties. Under the Squibb settlement,
the parties agreed that Squibb could be f.xcIuded from
may 2002
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reporting and paying royalties for up to six percent of
their copying, which was considered fair use.
A decade later, newsletter publisher Washington Business Information sued the Collier, Shannon ·& Scott law
firm for making cover-to-cover copies of newsletters and
sending them to attorneys throughout the firm . The firm
reportedly paid a huge amount of money to the publisher
to settle the lawsuit4 • In 1999, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene &
MacRae (a large New York-based law firm) purchased a
multi-year photocopying license with the CCC and paid
. an undisclosed settlement to avoid a copyright infringement suit brought by four publishers.
Although the result in each of these cases was similara settlement or a judicial decision in favor of the plaintiff
publisher-one must distinguish the cases on their facts.
In the actions against the pharmaceutical companies and
the law firms, the defendants were for-profit entities not
in the business of profiting from making in-house copies
of copyrighted works. By contrast, the for-profit document deliverers and the copyshops directly profit from
making copies of copyrighted works. The section 108 library exemption and the section 107 fair use provision of
the Copyright Act should be applied differently to these
different types of for-profit companies.

Fair Use In The For-Profit Sector
Section 107 provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and I06A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, iT/.cluding such use
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include: (l) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a comniercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished
shall not itself bar a finding Oflfair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
The extent to which in-house copying by a company not
in the business of generating revenue from making copies may qualify as a fair use tal;:es us to the most important in-house copying case, American Geophysical Union
v. Texaco. The Association of American Publishers coordinated the lawsuit against Texaco in the name of five
publishers. Before trial, the parties stipulated that al-
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though Texaco employed hundreds of research scientists
(all or most of whom presumably photocopied scientific
journal articles to support Texaco research), the trial
would focus on activities of one scientist, Dr. Donald H.
Chickering. II, who photocopied eight articles from the
Journal of Catalysis and placed them in his files. In 1992
a federal district court held that Thxaco's routing journals to Dr. Chickering, and his subsequent copying articles and filing them away, was not a fair uses. 1\vo
years later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court decision 6 •
The district court judge spent considerable time examining the first fair use factor-the purpose and character of
the use. As for the purpose of the use, the juqge wrote
that because the defendant was a for-profit company, its
copying was "commercial." As for the character of the
use, the judge wrote that the copying was not transformative; Dr. Chickering simply made mechanical photocopies of complete articles for his convenience and there
was little evidence that he relied on the articles in conducting later research.
Texaco appealed the lower court decision to the U.S. Court
of Appeals. In its examination of the first fair use factor,
the appeals court used as guidance a case recently decided
7
by the U.S. Supreme Court, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music •
In Campbell, the Supreme Court wrote that when a court
looks at the purpose of the use, it must determine whether
the use is nonprofit educational, for-profit commercial or
something else. As for the character of the use, a court
must determine "whether and to what extent it is 'transformative: altering the original with new expression, meaning, or message. The more trans formative the new work,
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use"8 .
The appellate court in Texaco struggled with the first fair
use factor, .trying to determine if Dr. Chickering's copying was, as the district court concluded, commercial copying. Unlike the district court, the appeals court noted that
Texaco did not directly profit from the copying. It concluded that the purpose was neither "for profit" nor "nonprofit educational," calling it instead ·an "intermediate"
use 9 • As in the district court .. the appellate court concluded that the copying was not transformative.
The appellate court also called Te."<aco's activities "archival- i.e, done for the primary putpose of providing numerous Texaco scientists with his or .h er own personal
copy of each article without Texaco having to purchase
another original journal"IO. Although the court wrote that
it did not intend to suggest that all archival copying is
infringing, it concluded that the first factor tilted against
Texaco because "the making of copies to be placed on the
shelf in Chickering's office is part of a systematic process
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of encouraging employee researchers to copy articles so
as to multiply available copies while avoiding payment" II .
The appeals court concluded its discussion of the first
factor by writing:
"On balance, we agree with the district court that the first
factor favors the publishers, primarily because the dominant purpose of the use is a systematic institutional policy
of multiplying the available number of copies of pertinent
copyrighted articles by circulating the journals among
employed scientists for them to make copies, thereby serving the same purpose for which additional subscriptions
are normally sold, or, as will be discussed, for which photocopying licenses may be obtained"'2.

market for reprints of a journal article or book chapter
and royalty or licensing fees. The Court also wrote that
courts should examine more than the market impact of
the individual defendant's copying. Rather, they should
also consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market for the original"14. Both the district and appellate
courts in Texaco noted: the publishers lost sales of additional journal subscriptions, back issues and back volumes, as well as licensing revenue and fees; the Copyright Clearance Center makes it easy to pay royalties; and
the fourth factor favored the publishers l5 •

The second fair use factor examines the nature of the
work copied. Copying informational; scientific or factual
works is more favored than copying more creative (or
expressive) works such as fiction or poetry. Because the
purpose of copyright is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts (in today's terms, "knowledge"),
copying factual, scientific or other scholarly works is more
likely to achieve this overarching goal. Both the district
and appeals courts characterized the articles in Catalysis
as factual in nature and concluded that the second factor
favored Texaco.

The fourth factor also presents another ele~ent-which
party has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was
harmed? One might think that a plaintiff in a copyright
suit must carry this burden, but that is not always the
case. Recall the first fair use factor-the purpose and character of the use. In Campbell, the Supreme Court wrote
that a court shc;lUld presume harm-and thereby require
the defendant to.demonstrate that the market for the work
copied was not harmed-when there has been verbatim
(non-transforming) copying for commercial purposes. In
other words, when both the "purpose" and "character"
portions of the first factOr are held against the d'e fendantwhen the copying is both commercial and non-transformative-a court will presume that the plaintiff was
harmed by the use. In such cases, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove that the plaintiff was not harmed, a
difficult (and probably insurmountable) challenge.

Texaco lost the third factor in the fair use analysis-the
amount copied-in both·courts. As a general matter, the
more of a work that is copied, the less likely it is that the
defendant in a copyright suit will win this factor. We must
remember there are two copyrights involved in journal
publications. First, the issue of the journal may be copyrighted as a compilation. Second, e::tch journal article is,
in itself, a complete copyrightable work. Copying entire
articles, as was done by Dr. Chickering, invariably results in the defendant losing this third factor.
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of the use
on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. Simply put, courts are more likely to find an infringement when the copyright owner incurs financial
harm due to unauthorized (or uncompensated) copying.
The fourth factor has an interesting and somewhat complex history, and deserves more comment.
In 1985 the Supreme Court called the fourth factor "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use"IJ.
A decade later in Campbell, the Court wrote that no factor has primacy over any other.
The Campbell Court said much more about the fourth
factor that does not bode well for fair use. It wrote that
When examining harm to the copyright owner, a court
should consider whether the market lost was one contemplated by the copyright owner. This may include the
impact on the market for derivative works, such as the
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Texaco instructs us that large scale routing of journals to
researchers in a for-profit company, and subsequent copying of articles by researchers who filed the copies away
(often without even reading them) to create their own personal mini-libraries, is not a fair use. The appeals court
concluded that systematic routing of journal articles to
company employees, with knowledge that the employees
would then copy articles and create personal "libraries,"
was beyond that which is permitted under section 107.

So where does this leave us? Remember that fair use is
an equitable rule of reason. Whether a particular use is
fair, or instead infringing, depends on the particular facts
of the case. Failure to purchase as many subscriptions a
company really needs-if large-scale copying either by
the library or by end users substitutes for subscriptionsis problematic not only in a for-profit company such as
Texaco, but also in nonprofit educational institutions.
But the Second Circuit did not say that all copying in forprofit companies is infringing. Although organizations
such as the Association of American Publishers and the
Copyright Clearance Center might like businesses to think
that the holding in Texaco applies to every instance of
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commercial copying, that's simply not the case. The court
confined its ruling "to the institutional, systematic, archival multiplication of copies revealed by the recordthe precise copying that the parties stipulated should be
the basis for the District Court's decision now on appeal
and for which licenses are in fact available"16. But the
analysis does not end with section 107; we also must consider the section 108 library exemption.

The Section 108 Library Exemption
Section 108 of the Copyright Act permits libraries to make
copies for their patrons under certain circumstances. The
legislative history of the Act indicates that the library
exemption applies to both the for- and nonprofit sectors l7 •
In addition to permitting some level of in-house copying,
section 108 also permits libraries to engage in interlibrary
transactions to acquire a copy of a journal article or an
excerpt from a book for their institutional patrons, such
as students and faculty in a university, corporate researchers or law firm attorneys.
Section 108(d) permits making cOPi~S of articles and excerpts from copyrighted works, but there are some basic
requirements for qualifying for the section 108 exemption:
• The library may only make or acquire a single copy of
an a~cle or excerpt for the patron who requests it;
multiple copies are prohibited.
• The copy must become the property of the requestor;
the library may not add it to the collection.
• The library must not profit directly or indirectly from
the copy; it cannot charge clients more than the copy
cost, nor profit in any way from making such copies.
• The copy must inclUde the notice of copyright from
the copy reproduced, or if it is not available, a legend
tha.t reads that the material copied is subject to the
~ll1t~d States copyright law and that further reproduction m violation of that law is prohibited.
• The library must include on its order form, and at the
p.lace where orders are accepted, a warning of copynght as specified by the Copyright Office.
• The library must be open to the public or to researchers in a specialized field. A library may meet this last
reqUirement if it participates in reciprocal interlibrary
lending/document delivery.
Section 108 rights are not unlimited; sections 108(g)(1)
and (2) include important restrictions. Subsection (g) (1)
proVides that a library may not engage in related or concerted reproduction or distribution of multiple copies of
the same material, whether made at one time or over a
period of time and whether intended for aggregate use
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by one or more individuals or by individual members of
a group. Subsection (g) (2) prohibits a library from engaging in the systematic reproduction or distribution of
single or multiple copies.
As noted earlier, Texaco was not decided under section 108;
the parties agreed it would be decided on fair use alone. But
one thing appears clear: although the library apparently was
routing journals to Thxaco researchers, it was not making
copies for them. Had the library been making multiple copies of the same article for different researchers throughout
the corporation, a court might have concluded that the copying was prohibited by the subsection (g) (1) prohibition
against "related or concerted" copying. And if the library
was making copies of different articles from the ~ame journal title in such quantity that photocopying substitutes for
additional SUbscriptions, the subsection (g) (2) prohibition
against systematic copying kicks in.
Whether the nature and level of copying in Texaco would
have violated 108 (g) (1) or (g) (2) is a matter of speculation. Significantly, the appeals court decision did not
emphasize, as did District Court Judge Pierre Leval, the
for-profit nature of Texaco. Nor did it make overbroad
statements that corporate libraries have few rights under
the library exemption. Because Texaco was not a section
108 case, Judge Leval's statements are dictum-not germane to the issues before the court and not necessary to
the holding of the case.
The library exemption permits a library to engage in interlibrary arrangements, but not when the effect is that the
library receiving such copies "does so in such aggregate
quantities.as to substitute for a subscription to or purchase
of such work. " The Copyright Act does not specify when a
library might be using document delivery as a substitute
for a purchase or subscription. For this, the Guidelines for
the Proviso of Subsection 108 (g) (2), more commonly called
the CONTU Guidelines, must be consulted.
In a single year a library should not acquire through interlibrary loan/document delivery (for any article published within five years of the date of the request) more
than five such articles from the same journal title. The
"Suggestion of 5" does not apply if the library has entered a new subscription to the journal or if it already
subscribes to the journal but the requested issue is missing from the collection. Remember that this is a guideline, not an absolute rule. One could certainly reason that
more than five copies are permissible when a researcher
is working on a short-term, one-time project.

Conclusion
The primary purpose of copyright law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has written, is not to reward creators, but
rather to promote the spread of knowledge IS. Fair use
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decisions are fact-specific. If you have a factual situatign
just like those in Texaco-large scale systematic copying
to create individual research collections for corporate researchers who often do not even use the articles copiedpermission or payment of royalties is necessary; But the
appeals court did not say that a researcher in a for-profit
company could not occasionally copy articles or short
excerpts from books. Ubrarians should not expand the
holding in Texaco beyond the facts of that case.
The same is true when the library is making copies under the section 108 library exemption. An institution need
not acquire a journal subscription for every employee who
might read it. (Most publishers already price institutional
library subscriptions conSiderably higher than individual
subscriptions) . A library that qualifie's for the library exemption-whether in a nonprofit academic institution or
a for-profit company-may, under 108(d), make single
copies for employees if it meets the requirements of sec-
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from another library 19. Because the copy must become
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electronic publications have the potential to limit, if not
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read proposed licensing agreements, and dO.not agree to
terms you cannot live with. Remember that in the print
world, fair use and the library exemption remain alive
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generation ago, still kicking.
11

60 F.3d. 913 , 920 .

12

60 F.3d 913, 924.

Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Service, 99

1J

Harper & Row, publishers

F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).

566 (1985).

In Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. New York UnilJersity, 1983
Copy.L.Dec. (BNA) para 25,544 NYU, several faculty and a private copyshop were sued for creating coursepacks. The parties
settled, With NYU agreeing to inform their faculty of NYU's photocopying policies and to encourage them to comply with the
"Classroom Guidelines" that are part of the legislative history of
the 1976 Copyright Act.

14

l

, Both for-profit and nonprofit organizations should subscribe
for as many copies of a newsletter as needed. Although a library
may route newsletters, make sure that recipients are not making cover-to-cover copies.
5

American Geophysical Union

IJ.

Texaco, Inc. , 802 F. Supp 1

(S.D.N.Y. 1992) .
6

,American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2nd

Clr. 1994) .
7

8

CampbelllJ. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.• 510 U.S. 569 (1994).

ld.

The coun pointedly distinguished copying at Texaco f
h
'
rom
copys op copymg. It wrote n • • • our concern here is that the
court let the for-~rofit n~ture of Texaco's activity weigh against
Texaco Without dlfferentIaung between a direct commercial use
and the more indirect relation to commercial activity that occurred here. Texaco was not gaining direct or immediate commercial advantage from the photocopying at issue in this case . .
R:~er, ,Texaco's photocopying served, at most, to facilitate
IC enng s research, which in turn might have led to the deI
ve opment of
d 11
new products and technology that could have improve exaco's commercial performance.'; ,
9

Ch'

10

"

Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko 's Graphics. Corp., 758 'F.Supp 1522

(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
I

tion 108 and if it does not engage in activities proscribed
by subsections 108 (g) (1) and (g) (2) .

60 F.3d 913 , 919.

information outLook

IJ.

Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 ,

CampbelllJ. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).

15 "Despite Texaco's claims to the contrary, it is not unsound to
conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use
tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use
factor when the means for paying for such a use is made easier. "
60 F.3d 913, 930-31.

16

60 F.3d 913, 931.

17 "Isolated, spontaneous making of single photocopies by a library in a for-profit organization, without any systematic effon
to substitute for photocopying for subscriptions or purchases,
would be covered by section 108, even though the copies are furnished to the employees of the organization for use in their work.
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clause must attach to the immediate commercial motivation behind the reproduction or distribution, rather than to the ultimate
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behind the actual making or distributing of the copies, if multiple
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